








The paper extends and replicates part of the analysis by Barsky, Juster,
Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), which exploits hypothetical choices among
di¤erent consumption streams to infer intertemporal substitution elastici-
ties and rates of time preference. We use a new and much larger dataset
than Barsky et al. Furthermore, we estimate structural models of intertem-
poral choice, while parameterizing the parameters of interest as a function
of relevant individual characteristics. We also consider ”behavioral” ex-
tensions, like habit formation. Models with habit formation appear to be
superior to models with intertemporally additive preferences.
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11 Introduction
Increasingly, recent …ndings cast doubt on the conventional intertemporally addi-
tive utility formulation of dynamic choice. The inspiration for alternative models
often comes from other disciplines than economics. This is not surprising as the
time dimension has been actively investigated in the past in several areas, such
as personality theory and social psychology, and of course in individual decision
theory.
Generally, in both psychology and economics most of the empirical …ndings
have led to the conclusion that value and time exhibit a negative relation, so
that the value of a certain good is discounted as a function of the time when
it will be received (Horowitz, 1988). The most usual discounting function for
representing time preferences has an exponential shape. An alternative, more
concave curve has been proposed (Ainslie, 1975) as the result of observations of
animal behavior. More recently, Laibson (1997) and Laibson, Repetto and To-
bacman (1998), among others, have modelled the apparent empirical regularity
that short-run discount rates are much higher than long-run ones by means of a
hyperbolic function. People are more sensitive to a given time delay if it occurs
earlier rather than later. As a consequence, behavior is dynamically inconsis-
tent (Strotz, 1956; Ainslie, 1975; Elster, 1977) and discount rates decrease as a
function of the time delay over which they are estimated. Ample evidence has
accumulatated for the fact that the conventional intertemporally additive utility
formulation with exponential discounting provides an inadequate model of dy-
namic choice. As a result of this, alternative formulations have been developed.
Two important strands are, what might be called, changing-tastes models and
self-control models.
Changing tastes models account for the fact that preferences change over
time so that, as time passes, a consumer may revise his consumption plans.
The main point is how such an agent might behave in order not to become
dynamically inconsistent. Early work in this line of research was Allais’ (1947),
who considered the welfare implications of a consumer with exogenously changing
tastes. Strotz’s (1956) paper discusses the consistency problem for a particular
type of consumer planning his savings over a …nite time-interval. He showed that
inconsistency arises if and only if the individual discounts the utility of future
consumption with a non-exponential discount function. A revisited version of
Allais’ model can be found in Pollak (1968). Blackorby et al. (1973) examined the
2general problem of a consumer with changing tastes making choices from budget
sets. Their main result is that naive intertemporal optimization is consistent
only if intertemporal preferences are structured so that the future is functionally
separable from the present. Two illustrative models describing the behavior of an
economic agent through time have been studied by Peleg and Yaari (1973). In one
model, the agent is a producer-consumer with investment in one period a¤ecting
output in the next period. In the other model, the agent is a consumer operating
successively in a sequence of competitive markets, with saving in one period
a¤ecting income in the next period. Hammond (1976) considered dynamic choice
within an entirely general framework. When dynamic choice is inconsistent, two
alternative procedures are examined: naive and sophisticated choice. In the …rst
case, the agent ignores the fact that his tastes are changing; the resulting choices
will be coherent only in very special circumstances. In the second case, the agent
anticipates his future choices and chooses the best path from amongst those he
is actually prepared to follow through to their end. If sophisticated choice is well
de…ned, then it is consistent.
Closely connected to time consistency is the concept of self-control. This has
been investigated by means of models where the agent is assumed to be both a
farsighted planner and a myopic doer. The individual is seen as an organization,
so that the problem of self-control is basically the same as the agency con‡ict
between the owner and the manager of a …rm. It is therefore not surprising that
most of the work done in this …eld of research is based on a game-theoretic anal-
ysis. Some of the applications of the principal-agent model has been investigated
by Thaler and Schefrin (1981), particularly in the study of individual saving be-
havior. Both rules and incentives have been extensively taken into account. The
work by Laibson (1997) squarely falls into this category.
Some authors have found that socio-economic conditions seem to play a rel-
atively modest role in the explanation of dynamic choices, like the tendency to
delay reward or punishment or a tendency to procrastinate (Straus, 1962; Yates,
1972). In his study on intertemporal choice, health behavior and health status,
Fuchs (1982) …nds a positive, though not particularly strong, relation between
time preference and schooling.
Two di¤erent empirical approaches have been developed in the literature in
order to estimate individual preference parameters: the revealed preference ap-
proach and, what we shall call, the experimental approach. The …rst method
consists of making a set of assumptions on the true individuals’ preferences,
3observing the actual behavior and inferring the preference parameters. The ex-
perimental method consists of posing direct choices to respondents, which may
involve real or hypothetical payo¤s. The advantage of experiments is that one
does not have to model the full environment in which agents operate (particu-
larly constraints and uncertainty), but rather that one can fully specify scenarios
himself. On the other hand, of course, one may wonder how seriously respon-
dents are trying to give honest answers, in particular to questions that have no
consequences for themselves (hypothetical payo¤s). We will brie‡y review some
empirical literature using the two di¤erent approaches.
Exploiting an Euler equation approach, Lawrance (1991) estimates subjective
rates of time preference for di¤erent permanent income classes, by using US
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In her wealth-varying
RTP model, she assumes a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES)
as in the standard economic models with isoelastic utility functions. She …nds
that there exist wide di¤erences in intertemporal preferences across households
in a given age group. Particularly, estimated time preference rates exhibit a
strong negative correlation with measures of presample labor income and levels
of education.
Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) estimate a wealth-varying IES model using panel
data on the consumption of Indian households. Ogaki and Atkeson (1997) use the
same Indian panel data in order to estimate a model where both the RTP and the
IES may change systematically between rich and poor households. Their main
result is that the RTP is constant across wealth levels, while the IES is larger for
the rich than for the poor, implying a more volatile consumption growth for the
former than for the latter. This …nding is basically in line with that of Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991), that consumption growth is more volatile for stockholders
than nonstockholders in the PSID. Given the inverse relation between the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion,
a model with wealth-varying IES would predict that the wealthy should hold a
disproportionate share of aggregate risk and have more volatile consumption than
the poor.
A detailed study by Hall (1988) on data for the twentieth-century United
States shows little evidence for a large, positive IES. The main conclusion of the
paper is that this parameter may be close to zero and probably not above 0.2.
Earlier …ndings of substantially positive elasticities are reversed when appropriate
estimation methods are used.
4Hausman (1979) used individual household data on the purchase and utiliza-
tion of room air conditioners to estimate the intertemporal discount rates used
by consumers in order to evaluate the trade-o¤ between present and future costs.
These discount rates are intertemporal marginal rates of substitution that do not
separate heterogenous tastes from the in‡uence of di¤erences in taxes, capital
market imperfections and income uncertainty. He found an estimated average
annual discount rate of 26.4% (clearly above any relevant interest rate) and an
inverse relation with income. Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) cite a number of
other studies that …nd even larger discount rates. Explanations that have been
o¤ered include information barriers and liquidity constraints. Further explana-
tions have been provided by Kooreman (1995), whose main conclusion is that if
risk-neutral consumers anticipate a random lifetime of a durable, the assumption
of a deterministic lifetime results in an upward bias, as large as 35%, of estimated
discount rates.
Time preference has been extensively measured through survey techniques.
In general, respondents face a hypothetical situation involving di¤erent amounts
of money at di¤erent points in time and are asked to express a preference: this
approach implicitly reveals a rate of time discount. Implicit discount rates were
found to be negatively correlated with future time orientation and positively
correlated with big spending (Thomas and Ward, 1979). Kurz et al. (1973)
asked a sample of participants in the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance
Experiments a series of hypothetical questions such as: “What size bonus would
you demand today rather than collect a bonus of $100 in 1 year?”. They found a
mean rate of time preference between 0.36 and 0.76, and between 0.40 and 1.22
for whites and for blacks, respectively.
Donkers et van Soest (1999) and Donkers et al. (1999) used data from the VSB
panel survey1 of Dutch households in order to elicit information about subjective
measures of household preferences, …nancial decisions and risk attitudes. Their
main results are as follows: the rate of time preference is negatively correlated
with age and women are more patient than men; the subjective interest rate is
positively related to the decision to hold risky assets; the rate of risk aversion
increases with age and women are more risk averse than men; the e¤ect of risk
aversion on the decision to invest in …nancial risky assets is negative and highly
signi…cant is positively related to the value of the house and negatively related
1Now called the CentER Savings Survey (CSS).
5to the decision to invest in risky assets.
During the Sixties, several experiments (Metzner and Mischel, 1962; Grusec
and Mischel, 1967; Grusec, Masters and Mischel, 1969) on rewards and punish-
ments run with adults and children revealed that the greater the period of delay,
the lower was the probability that subjects would choose deferred rather than
immediate rewards. Moreover, adults generally preferred immediate rather than
deferred punishments. Similarly, in a study of the role of time preference in the
intergenerational transmission of income inequality, Maital and Maital (1978)
pointed out that the ability to defer grati…cation is part of the process of social-
ization and that after adolescence the propensity to delay grati…cation is quite
stable. Later on, it has been found (Loewenstein, 1988) that the amount required
to compensate for delaying receiving a real reward by a given interval was from
two to four times greater than the amount subjects were willing to sacri…ce to
speed up consumption by the same interval.
Our study falls in the experimental strand of literature in that we follow
Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) (BJKS from now on) in using ob-
served hypothetical choices between di¤erent consumption patterns to estimate
both the rate of time preference and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
As a theoretical framework we take the conventional intertemporally additive
utility model as a starting point. We then extend the model by allowing for
habit formation. By using hypothetical questions, the issue of self-control does
not arise. The hypothetical nature of the questions allows the respondent to
our questions to be a planner rather than a doer. Also, uncertainty is not part
of the framework in which questions are asked. So, when we speak of relative
risk aversion this refers to nothing else than the curvature of the intratemporal
utility function. The goal of the paper is to investigate the structure of in-
tertemporal preferences over consumption streams in as clean an environment as
possible. Thus we abstract from uncertainty and present respondents in a survey
with straightforward choices that do not involve complicated utility maximization
tasks.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes
the dataset we used for the experiment and presents the most relevant summary
statistics. The basic model (with intertemporally additive utility) is explained in
Section 3. In the same section we also present estimation results for this model.
Habit formation is introduced in Section 4, where two model speci…cations are
described, as well as the estimation outcomes for these two models. One of
6the distinguishing features of the conventional intertemporally additive utility
model is the inverse relationship between the IES and the relative risk aversion
parameter (in our context without uncertainty merely interpreted as a measure
of the concavity of the utility function). Introduction of habit formation breaks
this relation. Section 4 also includes a derivation of the IES in the model with
habit formation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The dataset
In the empirical analysis we use data from the CentERpanel. The CentER-
panel comprises some 2000 households in the Netherlands. The members of those
households answer a questionnaire at their home computers every week. These
computers may either be their own computer or a PC provided by CentERdata,
the agency running the panel2. The CentERpanel is representative of the Dutch
population. In the weekends of August 7-10 and August 14-17 of 1998 a ques-
tionnaire was …elded with a large number of subjective questions on hypothetical
choices. The questionnaire was repeated in the weekends of November 20-23 and
November 27-30 of 1998 for those panel members who had not responded yet.
The questions we use present respondents with …ve di¤erent hypothetical con-
sumption paths and then ask them to choose one of them. A typical question
reads as follows:
Now imagine that you (and your partner) decide to take …nancial advice and
set up an expenditure plan, starting now and ending when you are ENDAGE years
old. The …nancial advisor tells you that, in your situation, there are a number of
options. These options will be presented on the screen below.
Please indicate by selecting a number, which expenditure pattern you would
prefer. When making this choice, please consider your family situation to remain
unchanged.
Please indicate your preferred expenditure pattern by selecting a number.
2The description refers to the time of the survey. Nowadays, CentERdata does not provide
a PC any longer but a set-top box.
7EXPENDITURE PATTERNS
(expenditures in guilders per month)
1 2 3 4 5
AGE
AGE1 PAT111 PAT112 CONS PAT114 PAT115
AGE2 PAT121 PAT122 CONS PAT124 PAT125
AGE3 PAT131 PAT132 CONS PAT134 PAT135
AGE4 PAT141 PAT142 CONS PAT144 PAT145
AGE5 PAT151 PAT152 CONS PAT154 PAT155
AGE6 PAT161 PAT162 CONS PAT164 PAT165
AGE7 PAT171 PAT172 CONS PAT174 PAT175
AGE8 PAT181 PAT182 CONS PAT184 PAT185
AGE9 PAT191 PAT192 CONS PAT194 PAT195
Select expenditure pattern 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.
² After this question, three more, similar, questions are asked. The vari-
ables ENDAGE, AGE1-AGE9, PAT111-PAT195 vary depending on the
respondent’s characteristics:
² ENDAGE depends on the respondent’s age: if the respondent is younger
than 56, ENDAGE is equal to 65; if the respondent is between 56 and 65,
ENDAGE is equal to 75; if the respondent is between 66 and 75, ENDAGE
is 85. The questions are not posed to respondents older than 76.
² The variables AGE1-AGE9 divide up the interval between the respondent’s
own age and ENDAGE in (almost) equal parts. AGE1 is equal to the
respondent’s own age and AGE9 is equal to ENDAGE.
82.1 The data generating process
The format of the questions cited above is very similar to that used by BJKS.
The main di¤erence is that in contrast to BJKS the computerized nature of the
CentERpanel allows us to present each respondent with a series of choices that
is related to the respondent’s own circumstances. Not only is the age range a
function of the respondent’s own age, also the amounts are chosen in such a way
that they are not too far from the respondent’s own current consumption level.
The various consumption patterns have been generated as follows. Let y be
the income of the household. Let ² be a uniformly distributed random variable
on [:8;1:2]. For each respondent we draw one value from the distribution of ² and
compute C = :9y²: C is the ‡at consumption path that is given to the respondent
as one of the possible choices (the middle column in the question cited above).
The remaining consumption paths are derived from C as follows.
Draw four random variables: ®1 from U[¡:05;¡:025]; ®2 from U[¡:025;0], ®3
from U [0;:025]; and ®4 from U[:025;:05]. These random variables are growth
rates. Let the current age of a respondent be l (i.e. AGE1 in the question)
and let the …nal year of his or her consumption horizon be L (ENDAGE in the
question). Furthermore let ci
l be the consumption level at age l in path i = 1;:::;4
(the construction of ci
l is described below).Then the consumption level in path i
at any given age ¿ between l and L is given by ci
¿ = ci
l:(1+®i)¿¡l: In other words,
a consumption pattern is completely characterized by its initial value ci
l and the
growth rate ®i. It remains to describe the way the initial values ci
l are generated.
The following somewhat arti…cial procedure has been adopted. Let ri be a
random interest rate drawn from a uniform distribution on [¡15;15]. Given the
interest rate ri and the growth rate ®i we choose ci
l in such a way that the present
discounted value of the consumption stream fci
¿ = ci
l:(1 + ®i)¿¡lgL
¿=l is equal to
































































1 ¡ (AiRi)L¡l+1 (4)
Although for our analysis the exact way in which the consumption paths have
been generated is of no great consequence, the procedure followed ensures that
respondents are faced with choices that do not deviate wildly from their own
consumption level.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
In total, the questions have been posed to 1711 respondents. After deleting obser-
vations with missing values on some relevant variables we are left with a sample
of 1557 observations. We constructed three levels of education: the “low level of
education” consists of primary school, low-level high school, junior high school,
junior vocational training, special low-level education and apprentice system; the
“middle level of education” consists of senior high school and senior vocational
training; the “high level of education” consists of vocational colleges and univer-
sity education. There are 885 males and 672 females and their ages range from
22 to 75. More than 80% of the sample respondents have a partner, whereas the
three levels of education we constructed are homogeneously represented (Table
1).
Age classes Gender Level of Education Marital status
Fem. Males Low Middle High Single Married
22-32 yrs 87 75 33 79 50 51 111
33-43 194 226 121 164 135 72 348
44-55 206 269 185 132 158 79 396
56-66 126 197 126 96 101 57 266
67-75 59 118 70 45 62 38 139
Total 672 885 535 516 506 297 1260
Table 1: Distribution of sample respondents across age classes






















Figure 1: Age distribution of respondents
Table 2 presents the frequency with which certain columns are chosen. One
observes that the middle columns are chosen more frequently than the extreme
patterns 1 and 5. Observe also that as a result of the way in which consumption
patterns have been generated the …rst two consumption patterns presented are
always upward sloping, whereas consumption patterns 4 and 5 are always down-
ward sloping. One should probably suspect that not all respondents are equally
conscientious in carrying out the task of selecting the optimal consumption path.
One way in which this may show up is in ”routine selection”. For instance, re-
spondents may always pick the …rst consumption path or always the middle one,
etc. It turns out that about half (48.9%) of the respondents pick the same col-
umn in all four questions. See Table 3. This may re‡ect a genuine preference for
the column they pick, but it may also re‡ect an arbitrary choice. Clearly, with
hindsight the order of the columns in the questions should have been randomized.
11Cons. pattern Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
1 179 11.50 165 10.60 161 10.34 149 9.57
2 395 25.37 408 26.20 385 24.73 407 26.14
3 476 30.57 473 30.38 516 33.14 509 32.69
4 331 21.26 341 21.90 320 20.55 315 20.23
5 176 11.30 170 10.92 175 11.24 177 11.37
Total 1557 100 1557 100 1557 100 1557 100
Table 2: Frequency of consumption patterns choice







Table 3: Persistence of consumption patterns choice
123 The basic model
As a starting point we model the choice of consumption path as the result of
maximizing an intertemporally additive utility function. That is, a respondent















where u(c) is a concave utility function and ¯t is the weight given to utility in
period t. Given that AGE1 is equal to the respondent’s own age, we can interpret
period l ´ AGE1 as being the present, whereas L is the period in which the
respondent either turns 65, or 75, or 85. Thus, depending on a respondent’s
age, the time period over which the consumption path is de…ned will vary. For
instance, if a respondent is 40, the time period will cover 25 years: 40-65. If
a respondent is 75 years of age, the time period will cover only 10 years: 75-
85. The wording of the question does not specify the consumption level in years
in between the ages speci…ed. We will interpret the consumption levels in the
questions as representative of a smooth path from AGE1 to AGE9. Given the
data generating process, the utility of a consumption path can be written as
a function of the parameters of the data generating process, as will be shown
below. In order to arrive at an estimable model, we make a number of additional
assumptions. To begin with we assume exponential discounting; that is, the






To allow for random variation in choices (for instance due to non-observable
variation in preferences), we add an i.i.d. extreme value distributed error term
to the utility function:
u
¤
p = ¹ up + "p p = 1;:::;5 (7)
3Although we will later generalize this model to allow for habit formation, we will maintain
the assumption of exponential discounting throughout. The motivation for this is that in the
hypothetical and long term planning context that we study here, issues of self-control are much
less likely to arise. In that sense the results presented do indeed refer to dynamic choices over
a long horizon and not to short term intertemporal trade o¤s.
13where u¤
p represents the level of utility associated with consumption path p. Con-
sumption pattern p is chosen (which we denote as dp = 1) whenever it yields a










According to this model we then have the familiar logit form for the probability
that consumption path p is chosen:






To close the model, we specify the form of the instantaneous utility function u
and we exploit the speci…cs of the data generating process. For the instantaneous
utility function we adopt the CRRA-speci…cation:
u(c) ´ (1 ¡ ½)
¡1c
1¡½ (10)
The parameter ½ is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and 1
½ is the IES. As
mentioned above, we can write the utility function (6) as a function of the under-
lying parameters of the data generating process. Recall that the consumption at




i , where Ai ´ 1+®i: Inserting this into (6) and using













































Each respondent is asked to choose four times among …ve consumption pat-
terns. Thus we observe four choices per respondent. Estimation of the underlying
parameters (±; ½) by maximum likelihood is straightforward. It is worth men-
tioning that our methodology di¤ers from the one adopted by BJKS, as these
authors estimate the rate of time preference and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution by means of the Euler equation deriving from a standard formulation
of the consumer’s maximization problem. We instead do not assume individuals
to solve this problem.
143.1 Empirical results for the basic model
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the basic model. To allow for a pref-
erence for a certain column, we add dummies to the utility of each consumption
path corresponding to the particular column corresponding to that consumption
path. The choice of the …rst column serves as a reference category.
Parameters Coe¤. s.e. t-value
delta .175 .067 2.59
ln(rho) .283 .049 5.80
Dummy for column 2 .934 .078 12.05
Dummy for column 3 1.86 .291 6.39
Dummy for column 4 .786 .097 8.06
Dummy for column 5 .216 .130 1.66
Log likelihood -9468.0
Table 4: Preference parameters for consumption paths (basic model)
Table 4 shows that these dummies are quite signi…cant, with the middle col-
umn being the favorite and the two extreme columns (the …rst one and the …fth
one) the least preferred ones. The estimated value of ± is in contrast with the
…ndings of BJKS, who …nd a preference for upward sloping consumption paths.
The estimated value of ½ (exp(:283) = 1:33) is smaller than usually found in the
literature. The implied IES 1
½ = 0:75 is larger than usually found. For instance,
BJKS (who use the individual data to derive bounds on individual parameters)
report an average upper bound on the IES equal to 0.36. Hall (1988) using a re-
vealed preference representative agent approach estimates the IES to be around
0.1.
3.2 Parameterization of ± and ½
We allow for variation in preferences, by making both ± and ½ a function of ob-
servable characteristics. The notion that preference parameters may vary with
background characteristics has a long history. For instance, the idea of a con-
nection between culture and patience has already been pointed out by Fisher
15(1930)4.
The estimation results with parametrization of ± and ½ are given in Table 5.
The parameters of age and age squared are jointly signi…cant at the 1% level for
both ½ and ±. Figures 2 and 3 provide a picture of the implied age functions for
the rate of time preference and the IES (or equivalently the coe¢cient or relative
risk aversion), respectively. Both graphs are non-monotonic in age. For ±, the
graph …rst increases and then starts falling after the age of 35. For ½ the graph
…rst falls and starts rising beyond age 40. Thus, roughly speaking people become
increasingly patient beyond the age of 40. The graph for ½ implies that risk
aversion is lowest at middle ages. The education dummies are jointly signi…cant
at the 5% level for both preference parameters. An increase in education appears
to reduce risk aversion and increase impatience. The e¤ects of household income
and gender are both signi…cant at the 5% level. Women are more patient than
men and are more risk averse. Patience rises with income, as also found by
Lawrance (1991). The latter result seems to give support to the idea that poverty
“... increases the want for immediate income even more than it increases the want
































time preference by age
age





4“In the case of primitive races, children, and other uninstructed groups in society, the future
is seldom considered in its true proportions” (Fisher, 1930 p.81)
16Table 5: Preference parameters for consumption paths
Parameter Coe¤. s.e. t-value
log(rho)
age .0050 .002 2.65
age squared .00024 .0002 1.51
gender .216 .088 2.47
middle education .056 .047 1.19
higher education -.076 .060 1.27
log(household inc.) .019 .006 3.47
constant .048 .097 .50
delta
age -.0097 .002 4.32
age squared -.00034 .0004 .95
gender -.239 .110 2.18
middle education -.111 .075 1.48
higher education .362 .247 1.46
log(household inc.) -.013 .010 1.30
constant .477 .166 2.87
Dummy for column 2 .934 .077 12.2
Dummy for column 3 1.57 .170 9.18
Dummy for column 4 .781 .093 8.42
Dummy for column 5 .202 .117 8.42




















log of rel. risk aversion by age
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We now relax the assumption of intertemporal additivity of the utility function,
so that the marginal rate of substitution between any two periods is no longer
independent of the level of consumption in any two other periods. Thus, we






where, as before, L is the horizon, ± the discount rate, t denotes the time period,
v is the intratemporal utility function, ct is consumption in period t, and zt now
re‡ects the stock of habits5. To complete the model we have to describe the
evolution of the stock of habits. We consider two alternative cases: First order
Markov (AR) habits and Moving Average (MA) habits.
5Notice that in this context we only deal with rational habit formation (cf., e.g, Spinnewijn,
1981) as the respondents are assumed to consider the whole consumption path.
184.1 First order Markov habits
This is the simplest case. We specify zt as a function of ct¡1: An obvious speci…-
cation for the intratemporal utility function would then be v(ct ¡µzt): Of course
we may wish to consider transformations of ct, e.g. its logarithm. Let h(:) be
a monotonically increasing function, then a fairly general speci…cation for the
intratemporal utility function would be v(h(ct) ¡ µh(zt)):
Choosing the logarithm for the transformation function h; the intertemporal















¿¡1 for ¿ = l;:::;L, and zi

















































































4.2 Moving Average habits
In this case we let habits evolve according to h(zt) = ¯h(zt¡1)+(1¡¯)h(ct¡1);with
0 < ¯ < 1: In contrast to the previous case, habits now have an in…nite memory.
We can rewrite the speci…cation for habits as (1¡¯L)h(zt) = (1¡¯)h(ct), where






















The only di¤erence with the AR-case lies in the de…nition of the habit variable
zi










¿; t > l (19)
For age l we de…ne lnzl ´ lnzi
0. Furthermore, lnci
¿ = (¿ ¡ l)lnAi + lnci
l; for
















l]; t > l (20)


























































0 t = l





























with -¿¡l de…ned as follows:





Upon using (21) this can be written as
-¿¡l = (¿ ¡ l)[(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ µ)lnAi ¡ ln(1 + ±)] (24)
¡¯











]; ¿ > l




0]; ¿ = l (25)
Let us de…ne
¦i ´ (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ µ)lnAi ¡ ln(1 + ±) (26)





























exp[¦i(¿ ¡ l) ¡ ¤i¯















exp[¦i(¿ ¡ l) ¡ ¤i¯
¿¡l]
214.3 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the
model with habit formation.
The introduction of habit formation breaks the tight link between the coe¢cient
of relative risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution6. Below
we derive the IES for the model with moving average habit formation. This also
covers the AR-case, as the AR-case is a special case of MA, obtained by setting
¯ = 1. Our derivation closely follows Carroll (2000), which provides a derivation
of the Euler equation with a slightly di¤erent speci…cation of habit formation.
For the purpose of the derivation we simplify the notation somewhat by omitting
the superscript i. For a start, recall the speci…cation of the utility function and








lnzt = ¯ lnzt¡1 + (1 ¡ ¯)lnct¡1 = lnzt¡1 + (1 ¡ ¯)[lnct¡1 ¡ lnzt¡1] (31)






















xt+1 = R(xt ¡ ct) + yt (35)
lnzt+1 = lnzt + (1 ¡ ¯)[lnct ¡ lnzt] (36)
where R is one plus the interest rate, xt is cash on hand, yt is income in period













t+1)] = 0 =) (37)
6Of course, habit formation is not the only way to break the link between risk aversion and


































































































Substituting the expression for vz




































































































































































































Combining (48) with (46) and (39) yields
u
c


























































which is the Euler equation for consumption.



































fµ(1 ¡ ¯) + ¯g (51)
In principle equation (51) can be used to derive the IES for any given consumption
history. Such a derivation leads to rather messy formulas. It is therefore probably
of more interest to …nd the IES for a steady state consumption path.
Let us assume therefore that consumption grows at a constant rate ¾, i.e.
lnct+1 ¡ lnct = ln¾ (52)
and similarly for the stock of habits. Equation (31) then implies that















The last expression has a straightforward interpretation. For example, if
µ = 1, utility only depends on the growth rate of consumption, but not on con-
sumption itself. If µ approaches 0 utility only depends on the level of consump-
tion. If µ is not equal to 0 the parameter ¯ determines how strongly consumption
growth a¤ects utility. If ¯ tends to 1 (i.e., when the habit formation process has
a long memory and last period’s consumption has a small e¤ect on the stock of
habits), utility at a given rate of growth is higher than in the case where ¯ tends
to 0. The reason for this is simply that at a given rate of growth the ratio between
current consumption and the stock of habits is bigger with a long memory than
with a short memory.
The assumption of a steady state consumption growth simpli…es (51) consider-











































































+ ¾"´ =) (59)
R"´
2 ¡ [R + ¾"]´ + ¾ = 0 (60)









To check which solution corresponds to a utility maximum, we consider the special
case µ = 0. It turns out that for (62) we retrieve the usual Euler equation for the









½ + µ ¡ ½µ
[lnR ¡ ln(1 + ±)]
¼
1
½ + µ ¡ ½µ
(r ¡ ±) (64)
where r = R ¡ 1; i.e. the interest rate. Thus the steady state IES with habit
formation is equal to 1
½+µ¡½µ
7.
4.4 Empirical results for the models with habit formation
We estimate AR and MA speci…cations, both with and without parameterization
of the preference parameters. The estimation results for the AR and MA spec-
i…cations without parameterization are reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
For all cases, the number of observations is 1557, as in the previous sections. In
the speci…cation of the stock of habits we face the problem that we do not know
z0. Somewhat arbitrarily we have set z0 equal to :9 times household income.
7Carrol (2000) speci…es (36) in linear form rather than in log-linear form. Although his Euler
equations are di¤erent from ours, the implied IES in steady state turns out to be identical.
26The log-likelihood values for the two speci…cations is virtually identical (¡9440:8).
The estimates of ½ and ± are quite similar in both speci…cations. The parameter ¯
in the MA speci…cation is positive but not signi…cant. The parameter µ capturing
habit formation is estimated close to one. (Rational) habits appear to play an
important role in the choice of consumption paths in the sense that consumption
in a given period is almost completely evaluated relative to the stock of habits.
The most striking di¤erence between the results presented in Tables 6 and 7 and
the results presented in Table 4 (the speci…cation without habit formation) lies
in the value of ½: The estimates in Tables 6 and 7 imply much more curvature
than the estimate from Table 4. The steady state IES implied by Table 6 is :89,
whereas the steady state IES implied by Table 7 is equal to .88. This is slighly
higher than the IES implied by the estimate of ½ in Table 4 (.75).
In order to analyse whether and how the parameters are related to background
characteristics of the individuals, we once again parameterize the models. Results
are reported in Tables 8 and 9. To avoid an unwieldy number of parameters
to be looked at, we have adopted a general-to-speci…c strategy and restricted
parameters to zero that were (very) insigni…cant in a saturated speci…cation.
Unlike the previous case, the MA-speci…cation now exhibits a substantially
larger log-likelihood value than the AR-case (-9318 versus -9375). As ¯ gets to
zero, the MA-speci…cation model converges to the one with AR-speci…cation.
Thus, the AR-speci…cation is a special case of the MA-speci…cation and the dif-
ferences in log-likelihood indicate rejection of the AR-speci…cation. Considering
the demographic variables, age in‡uences ±, µ and ¯, whereas it turned out to be
fully insigni…cant for ½.
The relation between age and ± is almost linear, as shown in Figure 4: the
rate of time preference increases monotonically with age. Thslash
e habit formation parameter µ increases until the age of 62 (Figure 5) and
then declines. Gender has a signi…cant e¤ect, suggesting that for females habit
formation is less important than for males.
Figure 6 presents a picture of the age function for ¯. The graph is non-
monotonic in age: it …rst decreases until the age of 53 and then starts increasing.
This implies that young and, to a lesser extent, old individuals have a longer
memory for the past levels of consumption than middle-age respondents. Also
gender has a signi…cant in‡uence on ¯, as females exhibit a shorter memory of past
consumption levels less than males. Both income and education are insigni…cant.
27Table 6: AR-speci…cation
Parameters Coe¤. s.e. t-value
delta .121 .029 4.16
ln(rho) 1.19 .062 19.06
theta .945 .014 69.36
Dummy for column 2 .940 .075 12.52
Dummy for column 3 2.167 .259 8.36
Dummy for column 4 .846 .093 9.13
Dummy for column 5 .432 .127 3.39
log-likelihood -9440.82
Table 7: MA-speci…cation
Parameters Coe¤. s.e. t-value
delta .117 .030 3.89
ln(rho) 1.21 .063 19.16
theta .942 .016 60.23
beta .475 .701 0.68
Dummy for column 2 .941 .075 12.53
Dummy for column 3 2.151 .269 7.98
Dummy for column 4 .846 .093 9.14
Dummy for column 5 .430 .127 3.39
Log likelihood -9440.80
28Table 8: AR-speci…cation and parameterization
Parameters Coe¤. s.e. t-value
delta
age .005 .002 2.12
agesqu -.00002 .00005 0.65
constant .111 .042 2.63
ln(rho)
log(household income) .011 .005 2.10
middle education -.021 .034 0.63
high education .002 .045 0.04
constant 1.386 .069 20.18
theta
age .002 .001 4.54
agesqu -.00006 .00001 4.71
gender -.006 .003 1.97
constant .986 .006 154.67
Dummy for column 2 .977 .075 13.03
Dummy for column 3 3.044 .439 6.93
Dummy for column 4 .964 .095 10.16
Dummy for column 5 .747 .129 5.78
Log likelihood -9375.7
29Table 9: MA-speci…cation and parameterization
Parameters Coe¤. s.e. t-value
delta
age .004 .001 3.01
agesqu -.00004 .00005 0.45
constant .106 .039 0.01
ln(rho)
log(household income) .009 .006 1.34
middle education -.044 .041 1.09
high education -.085 .056 1.53
constant 1.425 .095 15.01
theta
age .002 .0003 5.92
agesqu -.00006 .00001 3.61
gender -.008 .003 2.25
constant .985 .010 102.95
beta
age -.012 .004 3.29
agesqu .001 .0003 2.63
gender -.093 .030 3.07
log(household income) -.058 .033 1.74
middle education -.143 .251 0.57
high education -.675 .435 1.55
constant .003 .350 0.01
Dummy for column 2 .991 .074 13.40
Dummy for column 3 2.841 .398 7.13
Dummy for column 4 1.009 .096 10.47













30 40 50 60 70 years







30 40 50 60 70 years







30 40 50 60 70 years
Figure 6: Age function for the parameter ¯
315 Concluding remarks
Our analysis is based on information from direct questions about hypothetical
intertemporal consumption choices. In comparison with revealed preference ap-
proaches, the use of directquestioning toelicit dynamic preferences over consump-
tion has the advantage of simplicity and the avoidance of strong assumptions on
the constraints faced by an individual. The results obtained in this paper appear
to be plausible. The rate of time preference in the preferred speci…cation (MA
habits) is equal to .12, which seems more reasonable than values found in many
other empirical studies. The estimate for the constant of relative risk aversion
(3.4) is in line with what has been found elsewhere. The main …nding is the
rejection of intertemporal additivity. Habit formation appears to be quite strong
and breaks the simple link between relative risk aversion and IES inherent in
simpler models.
The set-up of the questionnaire can be further improved, however. The
method e¤ects (”routine selection”) point at the need to randomize the order
in which the consumption paths are presented to a respondent. In particular the
fact that the constant consumption path is always in the middle is unfortunate.
Also, the way the consumption paths have been presented by giving consumption
levels at speci…ed ages potentially leads to ambiguity. A better way to present
consumption paths may be to show full graphs to respondents, or to assign all re-
spondents the same horizon of ten years (say). We could then also systematically
vary the horizon and investigate the e¤ect of this on the elicited choices.
32References
[1] Ainslie, G. (1975), “Specious Reward: a Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness
and Impulse Control”, Psychological Bullettin 82, 463-509.
[2] Allais, M. (1947), Economie et Interêt, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.
[3] Atkeson, A. and Ogaki, M. (1996), “Wealth-Varying Intertemporal Elastici-
ties of Substitution: Evidence from Panel and Aggregate Data”, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 38, 506-534.
[4] Atkeson, A. and Ogaki, M. (1997), “Rate of Time Preference, Intertemporal
Elasticity of Substitution, and Level of Wealth”, The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 79, 564-572.
[5] Barsky, R.B., Juster, F.T., Kimball, M.S., Shapiro, M.D. (1997), “Preference
Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: an Experimental Approach in the
Health and Retirement Study”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 729-
758.
[6] Blackorby, C., Nissen, D., Primont, D. and Russel, R. (1973), “Consistent
Intertemporal Decision Making”, Review of Economic Studies 40, 239-48.
[7] Carroll, C.D. (2000), ”Solving Consumption Models with Multiplicative
Habits”, Economics Letters, forthcoming.
[8] Donkers, B. and van Soest, A. (1999), “Subjective Measures of Household
Preferences and Financial Decisions”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 20,
613-642.
[9] Donkers, B., Melenberg, B. and van Soest, A. (1999), “Estimating Risk
Attitudes Using Lotteries: A Large Sample Approach”, CentER Discussion
Paper, n. 9912, Tilburg University.
[10] Elster, J. (1977), “Ulysses and the Sirens: A Theory of Imperfect Rational-
ity”, Soc. Sci. Information 16, 469-526.
[11] Epstein, L.G. and S. Zin (1989), ”Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Tem-
poral Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Frame-
work”, Econometrica 57, 937-969.
33[12] Epstein, L.G. and S. Zin (1991), ”Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Tem-
poral Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: An Empirical Analysis”,
Journal of Political Economy 99, 263-286.
[13] Fisher, I. (1930), The Theory of Interest, London: Macmillan.
[14] Fuchs, V., (1982), “Time Preference and Health: an Exploratory Study”,
reproduced in Culyer, A. J. : The Economics of Health, Aldershot: Edward
Elgar Publishing Limited, 1991 Vol. I. pp. 123-150.
[15] Grusec, J. and Mischel, W. (1967), “Waiting for rewards and punishments:
E¤ects of time and probability on choice”, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 5, 24-31.
[16] Grusec, J., Masters, J. and Mischel, W. (1969), “E¤ects of Expected Delay
Time on the Subjective Value of Rewards and Punishments”, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 11, 353-373.
[17] Hall, Robert E. (1988), “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption”, Jour-
nal of Political Economy 96, 339-357.
[18] Hammond, P. (1976), “Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice”,
Review of Economic Studies 43, 159-173.
[19] Hausman, Jerry A. (1979), “Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase
and Utilization of Energy-using Durables”, Bell Journal of Economics 10,
33-54.
[20] Horowitz, J.K. (1988), “Discounting Money Payo¤s: an Experimental Anal-
ysis”, Working Paper, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of Maryland.
[21] Kooreman, P. (1995), “Individual Discounting and the Purchase of Durables
with Random Lifetimes”, Economics Letters 45, 29-32.
[22] Kurz, M.,Spiegelman, R. and West, R. (1973), “The Experimental Hori-
zon and the Rate of Time Preference for the Seattle and Denver Income
Maintenance Experiments: A Preliminary Study”, Menlo Park, Calif.: SRI
Internat.Res. Memorandum no.21.
34[23] Laibson, D. (1997), “Hyperbolic Discounting and Time Preference Hetero-
geneity”, Harvand University, mimeo.
[24] Laibson, D., Repetto, A. and Tobacman, J. (1998), “Self Control and Saving
for Retirement”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 96-196.
[25] Lawrance, E. (1991), “Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence
from Panel Data”, Journal of Political Economy 99, 54-77.
[26] Loewenstein, G. (1988), “Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice”, Man-
agement Science, XXXII, 200-214.
[27] Loewenstein, G. and Thaler, R. (1989) , “Anomalies in Intertemporal
Choice”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 181-193.
[28] Maital, S. and Maital, S. (1978), “Time Preference, Delay of Grati…cation,
and the Intergenerational transmission of Economic Inequality: a Behavioral
Theory of Income Distribution”, in Orley Ashenfelter and Wallace Oates,
eds. Essays in Labor Market Analysis, New TYork: John Wiley.
[29] Mankiw, N., and Zeldes, S. (1991), “The Consumption of Stockholders and
Nonstockholders”, Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 77-112.
[30] Metzner, R., and Mischel, W. (1962), “Preference for Delayed Reward as
a Function of Age, Intelligence, and Lenght of Delay Interval”, Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64, 425-431.
[31] Peleg, B. and Yaari, M. (1973), “On the Existence of a Consistent Course of
Action when Tastes are Changing”, Review of Economic Studies 40, 391-401.
[32] Pollak, R. (1968), “Consistent Planning”, Review of Economic Studies 35,
201-208.
[33] Spinnewyn, F. (1979), ”Rational Habit Formation”, European Economic Re-
view 15, 91-109.
[34] Strauss, M. (1962), “Deferred Grati…cation, Social Class and the Achieve-
ment Syndrome”, American Sociological Review 27, 326-335.
[35] Strotz, R.H. (1956), “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maxi-
mization”, The Review of Economic Studies 23, 165-180.
35[36] Thaler, R. and Shefrin, H. (1981), “An Economic Theory of Self-Control”,
Journal of Political Economy 89, 392-406.
[37] Thomas, W. and Ward, W. (1979), “Time Orientation, Optimism and Quasi-
Economic Behavior”, Working Paper, Stanford University.
[38] Yates, J. (1972), “Individual Time Preference (delayed grati…cation) Be-
havior: A Review and a Model”, Working Paper, Michigan: University of
Michigan.
36